





This	 paper	 analyses	 a	 series	 of	 subsequent	 and	 connected	 investigations	 by	 a	 domestic	
European	 regulatory	 on	 the	 network	 of	 distribution	 of	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 across	 two	
jurisdictions.	 The	 analysis	 mixes	 script	 analysis,	 a	 narrative	 framework	 for	 enhancing	 the	
understanding	 of	 how	 crimes	 unfold	 and	 are	 organized,	 with	multi-node	multi-link	 social	
network	analysis,	to	observe	the	social	structure	in	which	crime	scripts	take	place.	We	focus	
our	attention	on	the	key	players	that	occupy	strategic	positions	within	the	network	of	the	
crime	 commission	 process,	 from	 where	 they	 overview	 and	 control	 the	 various	 phases	
(scenes)	 and	 perform	 brokerage	 activities	 across	 the	 scenes,	 and	 on	 strategies	 of	
concealment	 of	 illicit	 products	 beyond	 the	 façade	 of	 legitimate	 business.	 Our	 findings	
indicate	that	actors	in	charge	of	managing	the	proceeds	of	the	criminal	activity	are	also	the	
ones	better	positioned	to	monitor	the	entire	process.	The	overall	structure	of	the	criminal	
network	 shows	 a	 good	 level	 of	 resilience	 and	 efficiency,	 although	 actors	 do	 not	 adopt	
common	traits	of	a	criminal	lifestyle	that	facilitate	secrecy	and	covertness.	We	believe	that,	
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Introduction	
Counterfeit	 alcohol	 production	 and	 distribution	 is	 a	 high	 priority	 concern	 for	 EU	 and	
domestic	authorities.	A	report	from	Europol	and	the	Office	for	Harmonization	in	the	Internal	
Market	(OHIM	2015)	argues	that	despite	the	worrying	growth	in	counterfeiting,	the	rise	of	
domestic	 production	 in	 several	 EU	 countries	 and	 the	 damage	 it	 does	 to	 businesses	 and	
consumers,	there	is	no	comprehensive	picture	of	its	criminal	dimension	and	dynamics.	This	
paper	presents	the	results	of	the	first	study,	to	our	knowledge,	of	a	criminal	case	related	to	
the	 international	 distribution	 of	 counterfeit	 alcohol.	 Previous	 studies	 have	 looked	 at	 the	
distribution	 of	 other	 counterfeit	 products,	 like	 tobacco	 (Antonopoulos	 and	 Hall	 2016;	 Di	
Nicola	 and	 Terenghi	 2016;	 Kupka	 and	 Tvrdá	 2016),	 olive	 oil	 (Lord	 et	 al.	 2017),	
pharmaceuticals	(Lavorgna	2014a);	or	at	the	composition	of	surrogate	and	illegal	alcohol	in	
Estonia	 and	 Russia	 (Lang	 et	 al.	 2006;	 McKee	 et	 al.	 2005),	 and	 the	 extension	 and	
consequences	 of	 its	 consumption	 (Kotelnikova	 2014;	 2017).	 However,	 to	 date	 none	 have	
investigated	 the	 routes	 and	 structure	 of	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 distribution	 across	 European	
jurisdictions.	
A	 common	 underlying	 perspective	 of	 the	 public	 authorities	 is	 that	 counterfeit	 crimes	 are	
predominantly	 pursued	 by	 organized	 crime	 groups	 and	 that	 these	 in	 turn	 need	 to	 be	
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disrupted	 due	 to	 the	 inherently	 illicit	market	 contexts	 of	 their	 activities.	 However,	 it	 has	
been	argued	that	 the	problem	of	organized	crime	groups	 is	 in	 the	concept	 itself	 (Edwards	






trading	 relations,	 practices	 and	 networks	 in	 ‘grey’	 or	 ‘dirty’	 markets	 allows	 us	 to	 better	
understand	 the	 routine	and	 rational	practices	of	 these	 traders	 in	 their	pursuit	of	 crime	as	
enterprise	(Edwards	and	Gill,	2002:	204).	
To	 do	 this	 we	 combine	 social	 network	 analysis	 with	 script	 analysis,	 a	 fruitful	 mix	 of	
methodology	that	has	already	produced	significant	results	in	the	literature	(Morselli	and	Roy	
2008;	Bright	and	Delaney	2013).	 In	doing	so	we	aim	to	 increase	our	understanding	of	 the	
possible	recurrent	patterns	of	criminal	activities	in	the	specific	sector	of	counterfeit	goods,	
and	 to	 facilitate	 the	 task	 of	 guardianship	 in	 intervening	 and	 disrupting	 such	 criminal	
activities.	Our	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 is	more	 analytically	 useful	 to	 shift	 the	 narrative	 from	a	
focus	 on	 organized	 crime	 groups	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 tasks	 and	 opportunities	 that	
drive	 criminal	 activities	 and	 the	 efficiency	 and	 resilience	 of	 the	 networks	 involved	 in	 the	
crime	commission	process.	This	 in	turn	enables	a	more	valid	comparison	of	‘scripts’	across	






in	 each	 stage;	 and	 on	 the	 analytical	 advantages	 of	 combining	 script	 analysis	 with	 social	
network	analysis,	in	particular	with	a	multi-mode,	multi-link	network	approach	(Carley	2003;	
Schwartz	 and	 Rouselle	 2009;	 Morselli	 2010)	 where	 nodes	 can	 represent	 various	 entities	
(people,	 organizations,	 resources,	 locations)	 involved	 in	 the	 scene,	 and	 the	 ties	 represent	
the	type	of	actions	performed.		
The	 second	 section	 (Data	 sources,	 research	 questions	 and	 methodology)	 introduces	 the	
research	objective	and	questions	that	guide	our	study,	illustrates	the	data	sources	and	the	
data	 manipulation	 we	 used	 to	 obtain	 our	 material,	 details	 the	methodological	 strategies	
adopted,	 and	 presents	 the	 case	 studies	 under	 analysis.	 The	 following	 three	 sections	 are	
dedicated	 to	 data	 analysis.	 We	 first	 perform	 a	 script	 analysis	 of	 the	 available	 cases	 to	
identify	 the	 crime	 scenes,	 the	 actors	 and	 their	 resources;	 the	 sequence	 of	 actions	 and	
decisions	before,	during	and	after	the	criminal	activity	at	all	stages	of	the	crime	commission;	
the	 tasks	 that	 need	 to	 be	 performed	 to	 commit	 these	 activities;	 and	 the	 range	 of	 places	
where	 they	 are	 performed.	We	 subsequently	 organize	 this	 information	 in	 a	 multi-mode,	
multi-link	network.		
We	then	collate	script	and	social	network	analysis,	 to	 identify	 the	key	players	that	occupy	
strategic	positions	within	 the	network	of	 the	crime	commission	process,	 from	where	 they	
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overview	and	 control	 the	 various	phases	 (scenes)	 and	perform	brokerage	activities	 across	
the	 scenes.	 An	 innovative	 aspect	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 that	 we	 extend	 brokerage	 analysis,	
previously	adopted	by	Morselli	and	Roy	(2008),	to	observe	not	only	the	brokerage	positions	
of	criminals	in	the	network	of	relationships	with	other	individuals,	but	also	the	various	types	
of	 connections	 that	 such	 criminals	 maintain	 across	 places,	 business	 enterprises,	 and	












The	 International	 Trademark	 Association	 (INTA)	 defines	 counterfeiting	 as	 ‘the	 practice	 of	
manufacturing,	 importing/exporting,	 distributing,	 selling	 or	 otherwise	 dealing	 in	 goods,	
often	 of	 inferior	 quality,	 under	 a	 trademark	 that	 is	 identical	 to	 or	 substantially	
indistinguishable	 from	 a	 registered	 trademark,	 without	 the	 approval	 or	 oversight	 of	 the	









organized	 groups	 in	 order	 to	 redirect	 resources,	 but	 without	 having	 robust	 empirical	
evidence	 (Lavorgna	 and	 Sergi	 2016).	 This	 common	 tendency	may	 imply	 some	unintended	
and	counter-productive	consequences,	including	the	risk	of	overestimating	the	homogeneity	
of	 offending	 career	 and	 crime	 processes,	 the	misplaced	 allocation	 of	 public	 funding,	 the	










period,	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 obtaining	material	 profits.	 Ashby	 (2015),	 in	 his	 research	 on	
metal	theft,	departs	from	the	focus	on	the	categorization	of	criminal	association	and	prefers	











(Eckblom	 2003;	 Bullock	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Situational	 crime	 prevention	 theory	 identifies	 the	
potential	 points	 of	 intervention	 to	 disrupt	 such	 opportunities	 by	 breaking	 down	 the	
procedure	of	crime	into	sequential	scenes,	or	crime	scripts.		
Crime	script	analysis,	grounded	in	a	rational	view	of	human	behaviour,	was	first	developed	
in	 cognitive	 sciences	 (Schank	 and	 Ableson	 1977)	 and	 adopted	 in	 criminology	 by	 Cornish	
(1994:	 160)	 as	 ‘a	 way	 of	 generating,	 organizing	 and	 systematizing	 knowledge	 about	 the	
procedural	 aspects	 and	 procedural	 requirements	 of	 crime	 commission’.	 It	 specifically	
identifies	the	scenes	of	the	crime	commission,	the	decisions,	actions	and	resources	required	
at	each	 stage,	 and	 the	 cast	of	 actors	 involved	 in	 these	 stages.	 Scripts	 therefore	provide	a	
way	 of	 understanding	 the	 logistic	 steps	 (not	 necessarily	 linear	 or	 sequential,	 allowing	 for	
flexibility	and	actor	innovation)	that	take	place	across	different	scenes.	Within	each	‘scene’,	




Crime	 script	 analysis	 considers	 decisions	 and	 tasks	 as	 crime	 specific	 (Leclerc	 and	Wortley	
2014:	 3),	 but	 it	 also	 offers	 a	 way	 to	 produce	 potentially	 comparable	 patterns	 of	 crime	
procedures	based	on	the	repertoires	of	behavioural	sequences	(Leclerc	and	Wortley	2014;	
Chiu	et	al.	2011).	 Leclerc	et	al.	 (2011)	 suggest	 four	 levels	of	generality	of	 crime	scripts	on	
which	 they	 can	 be	 compared:	 the	 meta-script	 level	 comprises	 all	 crimes	 within	 a	
classification	(e.g.,	transit	crimes).	The	proto-script	distinguishes	different	subgroups	within	
an	 offence	 (e.g.,	 for	 transit	 crimes,	 traffics	 that	 involve	 humans,	 animals,	 or	 goods).	 The	
script	level	subdivides	the	offence	into	categories	according	to	a	specific	dimension	relevant	
for	 situational	 prevention	 (e.g.,	 type	 of	 good,	 situation,	 and	 modus	 operandi).	 The	 track	
level	provides	a	more	detailed	 study	of	offending	within	 the	context	and	specifications	of	
the	 situation	 in	which	 the	 crime	 is	 committed,	 as	well	 as	 representing	 the	 level	 at	which	
situational	crime	prevention	is	commonly	practiced	(Leclerc	et	al.,	2011:	212).	Systematising	
the	 information	 of	 the	 track	 level	 into	 more	 general	 script	 level	 categories	 allow	 us	 to	
compare	 the	 specificity	 of	 scripts	 across	 proto-scripts,	 and	 ultimately	meta-scripts,	 to	 be	





Hancock	 and	 Laycock	 (2010)	 go	 further	 and	 differentiate	 the	 primary	 criminal	 act	 (the	
offence	 process)	 from	 the	 criminal	 lifestyle	 and	 the	 participation	 in	 criminal	 groups	 and	
networks.	 These	 additional	 features	 of	 crime	 scripts	 can	 be	 relatively	 stable	 crime	
facilitators.	 Lifestyle	 features	 include	 the	 pursuit	 of	 anonymity,	 the	 disposing	 of	 large	
quantity	of	cash,	the	use	of	unregistered	vehicles,	pre-paid	phones	and	false	bank	accounts,	
and	the	corruption	of	legitimate	business.	The	criminal	group	can	present	different	levels	of	
organization,	 from	 highly	 permanent	 and	 hierarchical	 ones	 to	 the	 loose	 and	 temporary	
networks	for	a	specific	crime	purpose.	It	can	also	outsource	tasks	to	other	associated	groups	
or	 individuals	 with	 specific	 skills	 and	 resources,	 like	 any	 legitimate	 business	 would	 do	
(Hancock	and	Laycock	2010).	
The	 various	 potential	 structures	 of	 relationships	 of	 criminal	 groups	 (for	 example,	
hierarchical	 vs.	 sparse)	 can	 be	 observed	 with	 a	 social	 network	 analysis	 approach.	 Social	
network	 analysis	 has	 become	 increasingly	 popular	 in	 criminology	 since	 the	 1990s	 (Varese	





A	 first	 step	 in	 the	 literature	 therefore	has	been	 to	precisely	define	what	efficiency	 is	 in	 a	
criminal	 network,	 and	 how	 to	measure	 it.	 Bouchard	 (2007)	 proposes	 to	 equate	 efficiency	
with	network	 resilience,	envisioned	as	 retaining	 the	capacity	 to	act.	 In	his	view,	 resilience	
depends	 on	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 network,	 as	 in	 the	 likelihood	 of	 being	 damaged	 by	
removal	of	certain	parts	of	it	(actors,	ties);	on	the	elasticity	of	the	network,	as	in	the	ability	
to	 return	 to	 a	 previous	 state	 after	 disruption	 (for	 example,	 by	 replacing	 actors	 or	 re-
establishing	ties);	and	on	the	adaptivity	of	the	network,	as	in	the	ability	to	modify	according	
to	 the	 circumstances	 (for	 example,	 functioning	 without	 certain	 actors	 or	 ties).	 Other	
scholars	 proposed	 various	 ways	 to	 operationalize	 network	 resilience,	 as	 effectively	
summarized	by	Oliver	 (2014):	networks	are	more	effective	 if	 they	have	access	not	only	 to	
actors	and	 ties,	but	also	 to	 resources,	 and	 if	 these	actors,	 ties	and	 resources	are	multiple	
(Krebs	2002);	if	they	can	count	on	structural	equivalent	actors	(Klerks	2001;	Koschade	2006);	
and	if	they	are	embedded	in	overt	and	legitimate	networks	(Gimenez-Salinas	Framis	2013).	
These	 properties	 are	 believed	 to	 diminish	 vulnerability	 and	 increase	 elasticity	 and	
adaptivity.		
However,	when	tackling	the	empirical	analysis	of	criminal	networks,	the	literature	seems	to	
concentrate	only	on	one	 type	of	 actors,	 usually	 individuals.	 Carley	has	 already	 challenged	
this	limit	by	showing	the	importance	of	adopting	a	multi-mode	approach	that	considers	not	
only	who	 is	 connected	 to	whom,	but	 also	who	has	what	 resources	or	 skills,	who	 is	 doing	
what,	 and	 where	 these	 people	 are	 (Carley	 2003).	 She	 proposes	 a	 meta-matrix	 that	
summarizes	 the	 various	 types	of	networks	emerging	 from	 structures	where	nodes	 can	be	






of	 the	 network	 may	 provide	 to	 the	 criminal	 process,	 together	 with	 its	 geographical	
extension.	A	similar	approach	has	also	been	proposed	by	Bright	et	al.	(2015).	
There	are	 several	points	of	 connection	between	 crime	 script	 analysis	 and	 the	multi-mode	
and	multi-link	network	approach.	Both	observe	the	crime	process	as	a	set	of	organized	tasks	
that	 evolve	 over	 time	 and	 adapt	 to	 the	 contextual	 contingencies.	 Crime	 scripts	 can	 be	
deconstructed	to	identify	vulnerabilities	in	the	crime	commission	process;	likewise,	criminal	
networks	can	be	mapped	to	detect	weak	(or	strong)	links	and	actors.	Both	crime	scripts	and	
criminal	 networks	 are	 crime	 specific,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 can	 produce	 generalizable	
repertoire	 and	 behavioural	 scripts	 and	 relational	 structure.	 It	 was	 then	 an	 expected	
consequence	that	scholars	started	merging	the	two	approaches.	
Morselli	 and	 Roy	 (2008)	 offer	 a	 valuable	 example	 of	 this	 combination.	 In	 their	 view,	
networks	with	a	loose	structure	that	is	connected	by	people	in	brokerage	positions	are	more	
likely	 to	 be	 efficient	 than	 rigid	 hierarchical	 networks.	 Conversely,	 the	 removal	 of	 such	
connecting	people	diminishes	 the	 flexibility	of	 the	criminal	process,	 reducing	coordination	
opportunities	for	the	whole	network.	They	propose	to	use	betweenness	centrality	(Freeman	
1979)	 and	Gould	and	Fernandez	brokerage	 roles	 (1989)	 to	 identify	brokerage	 roles:	while	
betweenness	is	useful	to	identify	actors	that	keep	the	whole	network	connected,	Gould	and	
Fernandez	 (GF)	 brokerage	 roles	 are	 valuable	 to	 identify	 the	 actors	 who	 liaise	 between	
different	 scenes	 of	 the	 crime	 scripts,	 facilitating	 collaborations	 between	 people	 involved,	
but	also	the	feasibility	of	alternative	criminal	routes.	Alternative	routes	are	defined,	in	script	
analysis,	as	substitutable	facets	within	a	scene,	where	the	combinations	between	facets	and	
across	 scenes	 are	 referred	 to	 as	 permutations	 within	 the	 script.	 The	 higher	 the	 level	 of	
permutation	 of	 a	 script,	 the	more	 flexible	 and	 therefore	 efficient	 a	 criminal	 procedure	 is	
believed	to	be	(Morselli	and	Roy	2008:	74;	Cornish	1994).	
The	 innovative	 proposal	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 extend	 Morselli	 and	 Roy’s	 approach	 by	
substituting	 the	 social	 network	 of	 actors	 that	 are	 casted	 across	 scenes	 by	 a	multi-mode,	
multi-link	network	 (Carley	2003)	 that	 takes	 into	account	not	only	 the	 individuals,	but	also	
the	 organizations,	 the	 resources	 and	 the	 locations	 where	 criminal	 activities	 take	 place.	
Furthermore,	 we	 include	 various	 types	 of	 ties:	 personal	 (being	 friends	 or	 relatives);	
transport	 and	 logistics	 (selling	 and	 receiving	 goods);	 selling	 and	 buying	 goods;	 business	
(owning	or	having	access	 to	 resources);	and	other	 type	of	 ties	 like	paying	 for	 transactions	
and	being	otherwise	linked	to	the	cases	under	analysis.	By	adopting	a	multi-mode,	multi-link	
network	 approach,	 we	 can	 take	 into	 account	 the	 group	 structure	 and	 criminal	 lifestyle	
involved	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 counterfeit	 alcohol,	 but	 also,	 as	 will	
become	clear	from	the	description	of	the	case	studies	in	the	next	section,	the	various	cases	
of	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 investigated	 at	 different	 times	 and	 in	 different	 locations.	 The	
temporal	aspects	of	these	investigations	also	suggest	how	the	same	criminal	system	may	be	














business	 activities,	 properties	 and	 vehicles	 owned	 or	 purchased.	 This	 information	
was	 used	 to	 construct	 each	 suspect’s	 lifestyle,	 and	 to	 find	 evidence	of	 its	 criminal	
aspects	 (for	 example,	 being	 connected	 to	 people	 previously	 involved	 in	 criminal	
activities,	 being	 involved	 in	 previous	 criminal	 activities	 themselves,	 undeclared	
properties	ownership,	and	the	like).	




- Intelligence	 reports,	 consignment	 and	delivery	data,	 communications	with	 logistics	
firms,	communications	with	brands/manufacturers,	photographic	evidence	from	the	
locations	 of	 the	 criminal	 offences,	website	 and	 social	media	 adverts,	 seizure	 data,	
press	releases	and	media	reports	of	seizures	and	convictions.	This	 information	was	
gathered	by	the	regulator	in	collaboration	with	local	authorities	(Irish,	British,	Italian	
and	 French	 police,	 Revenue	&	Custom)	 and	 provided	 detailed	 data	 of	 the	 primary	
criminal	acts.		
- Email	 exchanges	 between	 the	 regulator	 and	 local	 authorities	 collaborating	 on	 the	
cases.	 This	 information	 was	 essential	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 international	







specifically	 on	 the	 combination	 of	 script	 and	 social	 network	 analysis	 as	 a	 method	 to	











charge	 of	 the	 investigation,	 thus	 some	 data	 (for	 example,	 relationships	 between	 the	
criminals,	or	available	resources)	might	be	missing	for	the	simple	reason	that	they	were	not	
observed.	Second,	the	regulator	is	an	institutional	organization	with	specific	aims,	resources	





priorities.	 Also,	 the	 investigated	 offences	 span	 different	 European	 jurisdictions,	 therefore	
the	 regulator	 must	 rely	 on	 the	 collaboration	 of	 other	 institutional	 organizations	 with	
different	aims,	 resources	and	priorities	which	may	slow	down	the	 investigations.	This	was	
particularly	 evident	 when	 analysing	 the	 email	 exchanges	 with	 cooperating	 authorities,	
where	 in	 some	 cases	 further	 actions	 were	 required	 but	 not	 pursued	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	
analysis.		





2. What	 are	 the	procedural	 steps	 required	 to	 commit	 the	 crime,	which	 emerge	 from	
the	analysis	of	the	available	data?	
3. In	which	stages	was	the	criminal	activity	concealed	behind	legitimate	practices,	and	
what	 inferences	 can	 we	 draw	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 legal	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 actors	
involved?		




To	 address	 these	 questions,	 the	 data	 were	 firstly	 qualitatively	 analysed	 to	 identify	 the	
procedural	 steps	 of	 the	 crime	 commission	 (scenes),	 and	 to	 distinguish	 the	 participating	
actors	(including	people,	organizations,	locations	and	resources),	the	relationships	between	
actors	 (existence	 and	 type	 of	 relationship),	 the	 location	 of	 actors,	 indications	 of	 criminal	
lifestyle	 (previous	convictions,	ownership	of	unregistered	vehicles	and	phones,	movement	
of	large	sum	of	cash),	and	the	‘scene(s)’	to	which	the	actor	belonged.		
The	 data	 were	 coded	 in	 Excel	 and	 imported	 into	 UCINET	 (Borgatti,	 Everett	 and	 Freeman	
2002)	where	a	multi-node,	multi-link	network	analysis	(Carley	2003)	was	carried	out.	In	line	








crime	 each	 actor	 spans,	 and	 what	 type	 of	 brokerage	 role	 s/he	 exercises.	 Gould	 and	
Fernandez	(1989)	identify	five	types	of	brokerage	roles,	according	to	the	direction	of	the	ties	

















seized	 at	 North	 port	 in	 the	 UK.	 The	 consignment	 was	 being	 transported	 by	 a	 haulage	
company	 (Haulage	 Co.)	 from	 a	 storage	 facility	 located	 in	 Ireland	 owned	 by	 Patrick.	 Its	
destination	 was	 two	 companies	 in	 the	 UK:	 NE	 Grocery	 Ltd	 and	 Food	 Wholesalers	 Ltd.	
Haulage	 Co.	 had	 sub-contracted	 the	 delivery	 from	 an	 Ireland-based	 logistics	 company	
(Transport	 and	 Logistics	 Ltd),	 which,	 in	 turn,	 had	 sub-contracted	 the	 delivery	 from	 ABC	
Logistics,	 a	 logistics	 and	 freight	 forwarding	 company.	 The	arrangements	 for	 the	 collection	























onward	delivery.	 This	may	have	been	done	by	David	himself,	 or	 by	one	of	 his	 employees	
(Michael	and	Graham).	
Parcel	 Network	 represents	 a	 network	 of	 several	 individual	 Ireland-based	 transport	
companies.	One	of	these	companies,	Crossways,	transported	the	consignment	destined	for	
Food	Wholesalers	Ltd	from	the	Parcel	Network	office	in	Ireland	to	a	transport	hub	in	the	UK.	
Its	 onward	 transportation	 to	 its	 final	 destination	 was	 arranged	 by	 Freight	 Inc.,	 an	
international	 freight	 network,	 whose	 network	 members	 include	 Crossways	 and	 Bard	










of	 Ireland.	 The	 markings	 on	 these	 bottles	 matched	 those	 in	 the	 North	 Case	 and	 Food	
Wholesales	 Ltd	 seizures.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 evident	 links	 between	 the	 three	 cases.	






In	 July	2014,	142	cases	of	counterfeit	wine	were	seized	from	an	address	 in	a	south	city	 in	
Ireland.	They	had	been	bought	from	Sean	by	Richard	via	an	advert	on	the	DoneDeal	website;	
Richard	 had	 previously	 bought	 wine	 from	 Sean	 in	 May	 2014.	 Both	 orders	 were	 sent	 to	
Richard	by	David	via	Parcel	Network.	Sean	met	Richard	 in	a	 local	hotel	 to	be	paid	 for	 the	
wine,	and	 to	offer	him	to	purchase	some	vodka.	Stephen,	Sean’s	brother,	was	stopped	at	
the	 airport	 and	 a	 large	 amount	 cash	 was	 confiscated,	 which	 was	 believed	 to	 be	 the	









between	 all	 these	 seizures,	 but	 it	 does	 demonstrate	 the	 wide	 geographical	 spread	 of	
counterfeit	alcohol	distribution.	
Script	analysis	
Script	 analysis	 identifies	 five	 specific	 ‘scenes’	 of	 distribution:	 collection,	 logistics,	 delivery,	
disposal,	 proceeds/finance.	 Within	 these	 ‘scenes’	 there	 are	 various	 ‘facets’	 (that	 is,	
permutations	of	ways	of	accomplishing	the	enterprise).		
Scene	1:	Collection	
In	 the	 North	 case,	 the	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 is	 collected	 and	 transported	 from	 the	 storage	
point	owned	by	Patrick	to	two	final	destinations,	and	the	collection	is	organized	by	James.	In	
the	 Delivery	 Ltd	 case	 David	 is	 contracted	 to	 collect	 and	 transport	 the	 product	 from	 the	
storage	point	to	the	local	delivery	hub	ahead	of	transnational	transportation.	We	consider	
James,	Patrick	and	David	as	belonging	to	two	facets	of	the	same	scene.	Official	paperwork	is	
provided	 to	 the	 subsequent	 logistics	 company,	 making	 the	 consignment	 look	 like	 an	
otherwise	legitimate	transaction/contract.	Once	the	consignment	has	been	taken	on	by	the	
logistics	 company,	 the	 illicit	 product	 is	 no	 longer	 under	 the	 direct	 control	 of	 the	 criminal	















criminal	enterprise.	 In	 the	North	case	 the	delivery	was	made	 to	NE	Grocery	Ltd	and	Food	































Table	 1	 summarizes	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 various	 types	 of	 actors	 to	 each	 scene,	 their	
actions	 and	 the	 resources	 they	 provide	 (where	 known/applicable),	 together	 with	 the	




After	 assigning	 actors,	 organizations,	 locations	 and	 resources	 to	 scenes	 (Table	 1),	 we	
proceed	to	construct	 the	network	of	 the	distribution	of	counterfeit	alcohol.	We	 include	 in	
the	network	every	actor,	alcoholic	product,	organization	and	location	that	was	mentioned	in	
various	 capacities	 in	 the	 record	 of	 the	 three	 investigation	 cases	 described	 in	 the	 second	
section.	 Each	 of	 these	 entities	 constitutes	 a	 node	 with	 an	 attribute	 indicating	 their	





personal	 tie	 (that	 is,	 family	 relationship,	 friendship	 on	 Facebook);	 a	 transport/logistic	 tie	
(that	 is,	 driving	 a	 van,	 ordering/collecting/receiving/sending	 goods);	 a	 selling	 tie	 (that	 is,	
buying	or	selling	counterfeit	alcohol);	a	business	tie	(that	is,	owning	a	firm,	subcontracting);	
or	 any	other	 tie	 (that	 is,	 paying	 for	 a	 transaction,	 having	 any	other	 involvement	with	 the	
case).	All	ties	are	undirected.		
The	 network	 thus	 constructed	 has	 68	 actors	 and	 129	 ties	 and	 it	 is	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 1,	





At	 a	 first	 glance	we	can	 see	 from	Figure	1	 that	 the	network	 seems	 to	 separate	 scene	1-3	
from	 scene	 4.	 Most	 of	 the	 selling	 ties	 (grey)	 are	 concentrated	 on	 the	 left	 side	 of	 the	
network,	while	the	transport/logistic	ties	(darker	grey)	appear	only	on	the	right	side.	These	





shows	 some	 interesting	 aspects:	 it	 seems	 that	 in	 comparison	with	 the	 North	 case,	 David	
multiplied	 the	 facets	 by	 breaking	 down	 the	main	 consignment	 into	multiple	 destinations.	
The	multiplication	of	facets	could	be	a	strategy	adopted	by	David	to	shift	attention	from	the	
main	points	of	delivery	of	 the	North	case	 (NE	Grocery	Ltd	and	Food	Wholesalers	Ltd)	 to	a	
large	 list	 of	 alternative	 routes	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 less	 detectable	 by	 authorities	 or	 to	
attract	the	attention	of	legitimate	couriers.	
The	 links	 that	 connect	 collection	 (scene	 1),	 logistics	 (scene	 2)	 and	 delivery	 (scene	 3)	 are	
worthy	of	attention,	because	they	are	the	points	at	which	concealment	is	likely	to	happen,	
and	where	 the	 illegal	 consignments	 are	 first	 entrusted	 to	 (scene	 1),	 and	 then	 recollected	
from	(scene	3)	the	legitimate	network	of	 logistic	firms.	Because	logistic	companies	are	not	
required	to	check	the	content	of	parcels,	once	the	illegal	consignments	are	embedded	in	the	
licit	 chain	 of	 local	 and	 transnational	 transport	 they	 become	 highly	 invisible	 to	 the	
authorities.	As	we	have	said,	the	use	of	legitimate	businesses	seems	to	provide	an	optimal	
solution	 for	 transporting	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 across	 national	 borders.	 However,	 the	
incorporation	into	legitimate	networks	also	represent	a	risk	for	the	criminal	organization:	if	
discovered,	it	is	easy	for	authorities	to	track	the	reverse	process	of	collection	and	delivery,	
and	 initiate	 investigations	that	 involve	the	 licit	business	 in	charge	of	storing	the	alcohol	at	


























Table	 4	 illustrates	 the	 number	 of	 times	 individuals	 occupy	 a	 specific	 brokerage	 position	
across	scenes,	together	with	the	total	number	of	brokerage	roles.	
[here	Table	4]	
First,	 we	 note	 (Figure	 1)	 that	 only	 John,	 Sean,	 Andrew	 and	 Steven	 are	 all	 personally	
connected	 via	 either	 family	 or	 friendship	 ties	 (groups	 and	 networks).	 David	 is	 introduced	
into	the	network	via	Steven,	but	is	otherwise	not	connected	to	the	others.	His	role	is	central	
in	 the	 delivery	 organization	 (primary	 criminal	 act),	 where	 he	 provides	 resources	 and	
knowledge	linked	to	his	legitimate	business	(lifestyle).	His	score	on	betweenness	is	not	one	
of	the	top	ones,	as	 in	the	case	of	Phillip	and	Sean,	who	are	both	 involved	 in	the	proceeds	
scene.	 Phillip	 is	 unemployed	 and	 previously	 involved	 in	 other	 alcohol	 seizures	 (lifestyle),	
where	he	paid	for	some	of	the	business	transactions	(primary	criminal	act).	Sean	is	in	charge	
of	selling	the	alcohol	(primary	criminal	act)	and	is	the	owner	of	a	property	abroad,	although	
we	cannot	assume	that	 it	was	bought	with	 laundered	money.	Other	actors	scoring	high	 in	
betweenness	 centrality	 are	 Peter	 and	 Sarah,	 who	 were	 found	 guilty	 of	 selling	 alcohol	
(primary	criminal	act).	
Gould	 and	 Fernandez	 brokerage	 measures	 produce	 a	 different	 ranking	 of	 nodes,	 and	
highlight	 the	 role	of	 further	 actors	 in	 the	network.	 Phillip	 and	 Sean	both	 rank	 at	 the	 top,	
while	 Peter	 and	 Sarah	 drop	 down	 the	 ranking.	 David	 now	 ranks	 first,	 followed	 in	 third	
position	by	 John,	who	 is	 involved	 in	 disposal.	 John	 is	Andrew’s	 brother	 and	was	 found	 in	
possession	of	a	large	number	of	bottles.	Interestingly,	Andrew	and	Steven,	both	involved	in	
proceeds,	do	not	score	high	on	either	betweenness	or	GF	brokerage	roles,	despite	being	two	




only	 connects	David	 to	 the	other	 central	 actors	 (groups	and	networks),	but	he	had	also	a	
large	quantity	of	cash	confiscated	at	the	airport	(primary	act).		
Whereas	 Table	 4	 only	 indicates	 only	 the	 number	 of	 times	 actors	 are	 found	 in	 a	 specific	
brokerage	position,	Table	5	specify	across	which	scenes	actors	exercise	brokerage	activities	
(we	analyse	only	the	role	of	people	with	the	highest	number	of	brokerage	roles).	Black	cells	






concealed	behind	his	 legitimate	activity	as	a	 courier,	but	 it	 is	 also	 the	weakest	 link	 in	 the	
whole	 crime	 commission	 procedure,	 because	 once	 the	 consignments	 are	 discovered,	 the	
trail	of	paperwork,	which	are	not	anonymized,	 traces	his	 involvement	and	responsibilities.	
He	 could	 potentially	 pretend	 to	 be	 unaware	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 consignments,	 but	 his	
personal	 link	 to	 Steven	 and	 his	 brokerage	 activities	 across	 all	 the	 scenes	 reinforce	 the	
suspects	of	his	criminal	involvement.	
Philip	is	involved	in	proceeds,	but	he	does	not	occupy	any	coordinating	or	gatekeeping	role	
connected	 to	 this	 scene.	 He	 instead	 liaises	 and	 consults	 across	 all	 the	 other	 scenes,	
indicating	an	important	managerial	role	in	the	crime	commission	process.	John,	involved	in	
disposal,	liaises	from	collection	to	delivery	and	proceeds,	and	acts	as	a	gatekeeper	between	
disposal	 and	 all	 the	 other	 scenes.	 Although	 his	 brokerage	 activities	 are	 less	 frequent	 and	
exhaustive	compared	with	Phillip’s,	their	profiles	complement	each	other,	and	together	they	
have	an	overall	overview	of	the	all	the	phases	of	the	criminal	activity.	Finally,	Sean’s	position	












distribution	 to	 draw	 attention	 away	 from	 the	 two	 main	 receivers	 of	 consignments,	 NE	




The	 actors	 in	 charge	 of	 transporting	 the	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 across	 the	 border	 between	
Ireland	and	the	UK	(David,	James	and	Philip)	seem	to	favour	the	strategy	of	using	long	chains	
of	 legitimate	 logistics	 networks,	 where	 alcohol	 can	 be	 easily	 concealed	 as	 a	 legitimate	
product	 (for	 example,	 water)	 and	 therefore	 can	 travel	 unobserved.	 In	 this	 respect,	 their	
strategy	resembles	the	one	of	cigarette	smuggling	across	Europe	via	the	water	route	(Kupka	
and	Tvrdá	2016;	Di	Nicola	and	Terenghi	2016),	but	it	is	different	from	the	‘car	trains’	across	
the	 Schengen	 border	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 (Kupka	 and	 Tvrdá	 2016).	 The	 similarities	 and	
differences	suggest	that	when	smuggling	across	water,	criminals	need	to	rely	on	legitimate	
logistics	 companies,	 whereas	 terrestrial	 routes	 can	 be	 covered	 by	 cars,	 owned	 by	 the	
criminal	 group	 and	 therefore	 less	 exposed	 to	 detection.	 When	 comparing	 this	 criminal	
activity	with	other	transit	crimes,	for	example	those	described	by	Lavorgna	in	her	analysis	of	
wildlife	 trafficking	 (2014b),	 we	 notice	 that	 the	 transport	 and	 distribution	 scripts	 coincide	
perfectly,	 suggesting	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 proto-script	 (Leclerc	 et	 al.	 2011)	 of	 transit	 crimes	
that	 is	 worth	 further	 investigations.	 The	 abuse/misuse	 of	 legitimate	 business	 by	 the	
criminals	 illustrates	 a	 clear	 interdependency	 between	 illicit	 and	 licit	 markets.	 A	 possible	
situational	 intervention	could	be	the	enforcement	of	the	requirement	for	 logistics	firms	to	
verify	the	content	of	consignments,	especially	in	international	transports.	
Once	 delivered,	 the	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 seems	 to	 spread	 around	 a	 well-ramified	 selling	
network,	on	which	we	do	not	have,	for	the	time	being,	enough	information.	However,	given	
the	 fact	 that	 some	 people	 in	 charge	 of	 disposal	 (John,	 Sarah,	 Peter)	 and	 some	 places	
(Stockton	on	Tees,	Norfolk)	have	emerged	as	very	central	 in	 the	network,	we	believe	that	
further	 investigation	 is	 required	 to	 follow	 these	 threads	 and	monitor	 the	 selling	 process.	
Together	with	people	involved	in	disposal,	the	other	main	central	actors	are	indeed	those	in	






know	 about	 a	 specific	 scene,	 all	 the	 other	 roles,	 and	 especially	 liaison	 roles,	 require	 a	
general	overview	of	the	whole	crime	commission	process.		
The	literature	also	suggests	that	the	risky	movement	of	money	and	commodities	is	usually	
the	 task	 of	 those	 in	 lower	 positions	 in	 the	 organization	 (Hancock	 and	 Laycock	 2010):	 we	
found	contradicting	evidence	 in	our	 case,	because	 some	of	 the	people	 involved	 in	money	
and	commodity	movements	 (David	and	Philip)	 score	high	on	 the	centrality	and	brokerage	
measures,	whereas	 Andrew	 and	 Steven,	 both	 involved	 in	 proceeds,	 do	 not	 score	 high	 on	
either	 betweenness	 or	 GF	 brokerage	 roles.	 This	 could	 indicate	 either	 that	 Andrew	 and	
Steven	keep	a	low	profile	in	the	crime	commission	process	to	avoid	the	risk	of	being	caught,	
or	 that	 the	 group	 is	 not	 highly	 hierarchically	 organized,	 and	 tasks	 are	 assigned	 to	 actors	
depending	 on	 their	 competences	 and	 resources	 (efficiency)	 rather	 than	 the	 need	 for	
secrecy.	It	could	also	be	that	some	of	these	people,	for	example	Sarah	and	Peter,	who	score	















help	 of	 another	 friend,	David,	 in	 charge	 of	 distribution.	None	 of	 these	 actors,	 apart	 from	
Andrew,	has	previous	links	to	criminality;	none	has	previous	convictions	or	displays	signs	of	
an	established	 criminal	 lifestyle.	According	 to	previous	definitions	of	organized	 crime,	our	
group	does	not	fall	into	this	category,	although	it	shows	a	solid	level	of	organization	in	the	
efficiency	and	resilience	of	the	network.	
In	 terms	 of	 advancing	 the	 literature	 on	 criminal	 networks,	 our	 analysis	 shows	 the	
importance	of	including	multi-mode	networks,	because	central	actors	are	not	always	people	
but	 can	 also	 be	 legitimate	 organizations	 and	 locations,	 and	multi-link	 networks,	 because	
differentiating	between	various	 types	of	 connections	 facilitates	 the	understanding	of	how	
the	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 organized,	 as	 indicated	 by	 Carley	 (2003)	 and	 Krebs	 (2002).	We	




however,	 is	 not	 to	 be	 taken	 as	 representative	 of	 the	 market	 for	 counterfeit	 alcohol.	
Different	case	studies,	of	different	scales	or	 for	different	counterfeit	products,	may	reveal	
possible	 roles	 of	 organized	 crime	 groups,	 as	 has	 been	 observed,	 for	 example,	 for	 food	
crimes	 (HM	 Government	 2014).	 Ultimately,	 the	 research	 question	 about	 the	 possible	
involvement	 of	 organized	 crime	 groups	 in	 counterfeit	 markets	 remains,	 but	 it	 should	 be	




alcohol	 across	 Ireland	 and	 UK.	 We	 use	 script	 analysis	 to	 identify	 the	 procedural	 steps	
required	 to	 perform	 the	 criminal	 activity,	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 each	 step,	 the	 available	
resources,	 the	 activities	 performed	 and	 the	 locations	 in	 which	 the	 criminal	 process	 took	
place.	We	 then	 reconstructed	 the	multi-mode,	multi-link	 social	 network	 that	 embeds	 the	
various	 entities	 involved	 in	 the	 crime	 process	 and	 performed	 a	 brokerage	 analysis	 of	 the	
actors	 that	 link	 the	 different	 scenes,	 coordinating	 and	 facilitating	 the	 performance	 of	 the	









timing.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	 categorical	 distinction	 between	
illegitimate	 and	 legitimate	 activities:	 criminals	 may	 not	 be	 organized	 groups,	 but	 simply	
people	 who	 engage	 in	 temporary	 criminal	 activities	 alongside	 legitimate	 ones,	 and	 hide	
behind	the	 façade	of	 legitimate	business,	which	gives	 them	the	required	cover	 to	manage	
the	distribution	of	illicit	products	(Pearson	and	Hobbs	2001	and	2004;	Lavorgna	2014b).		
Focusing	on	the	criminal	steps	and	the	networks	that	build	around	their	performance	seems	
a	viable	 strategy	 to	 investigate	 the	 involvement	and	 responsibilities	of	 the	actors	 that	are	
variously	connected	to	the	crime	investigation,	and	to	identify	the	vulnerabilities	within	the	
structure	and	 the	process	of	 the	criminal	activities.	By	proposing	 this	perspective	and	 this	
type	of	analysis,	we	hope	future	research	can	further	investigate	the	peculiarities	of	markets	
in	 counterfeit	 products,	 but	 also	 compare	 and	 contrast	 the	 scripts	 of	 various	markets	 of	
counterfeit	products	and	of	transit	crimes	in	general.	
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